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Abstract
Countries dier substantially in how they deal with politicians that come from the public
sector. Most constitutions include incompatibility and ineligibility rules due to concerns
about conicts of interest and the politicization of the public service. We study how these
rules aect the attractiveness of parliamentary mandates for public servants and thus the
selection into politics. We compile a novel dataset that captures the fraction of public
servants in 76 national legislatures as well as the respective (in)compatibility regimes. On
average, there are seven percentage points fewer public servants in parliaments where a strict
regime is in force. Supplementary evidence based on IV estimations shows that the fraction
of public servants in parliament is positively correlated with government consumption, but
not correlated with government eectiveness.
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1 Introduction
The identity of politicians matters for the political process and good government. This seems
to be self-evident as political control and the credibility of policy commitments in the demo-
cratic process are limited. A careful selection of representatives is thus important to bring the
outcomes of the political process as closely as possible in line with citizens' preferences when del-
egating decision-making power. An important aspect of politicians' identity is their professional
background. It determines the personal socio-economic conditions that inuence an individual's
decision to run for oce. It also shapes their private economic interests inuencing the behavior
once elected. Moreover, it comes with specic knowledge and expertise that is more or less
valuable in the parliamentary process.
In this paper, we concentrate on the single largest professional group present in most national
legislatures; i.e., the parliamentarians who are recruited from the public sector.1 An extensive
presence of this group poses several challenges when assessing political selection into national
legislatures. First, it raises concerns regarding political representation.2 An obvious dispro-
portionality in descriptive representation with respect to occupational background is considered
critical as work as well as life experiences of the representatives might systematically dier from
those of the represented. For instance, experiences on how to do business in the private mar-
ket are represented less. Regarding substantive representation, the question arises whether the
politicians with a public service background serve the interest of their constituents better or
worse than politicians with other backgrounds. A strong presence of public servants in parlia-
ment might well systematically aect the political process and its outcomes. A reason might
be the second challenge. Public servants in parliament compromise the (personal) separation of
powers due to their double role as agents in public service and as principals that supervise the
executive branch. This generates a conict of interest. Individuals holding both a legislative
and an executive position may face decisions as legislators that aect their role in the execu-
tive branch, for instance, when voting on the budget of their department. As a consequence,
government expenditure might turn out higher than without this tie. Third, and in contrast to
these latter concerns, politicians with a public service background embody relative independence
from specic business interests. Furthermore, they constitute a pool of people with rst-hand
information on public service issues and a revealed interest in these matters. Accordingly, where
public servants in parliament are made accountable to the electorate, their expertise may serve as
1In this group, we include all employees that receive public pay and have a work contract under public law;
i.e., for example, many professionals from the education sector such as teachers or university professors, public
servants and other employees in the public administration or police ocials.
2Concepts of political representation (e.g., descriptive and substantive representation) are central in political
science (see, e.g., Pitkin 1967).
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a check in the political decision making process.3 Fourth, public servants elected to parliament
may dier in (public service) motivation. If they get relatively higher motivational rewards from
engaging in parliamentary work than striving for rents, conicts of interests may arise less.4
In response to the challenges, countries adopted dierent regimes to regulate the involvement
of public servants in national legislatures. Some countries chose a compatibility regime, while
many other countries have instituted specic rules for politicians from the public sector to deal
with alleged conict of interest. These rules either specify the incompatibility of a public sector
position with a legislative mandate or even declare public servants ineligible for candidacy. We
hypothesize that these rules not only structure the legal relationship between public servants
in politics and their (prior) position in the executive branch but also systematically change the
pool of available candidates and elected politicians. Anecdotal evidence for the U.S. subnational
level, for instance, suggests that ineligibility rules adversely aect political competition as they
aggravate the shortage of candidates (Miller 2010).
We pursue three goals with our contribution. First, we aim to document the phenomenon of the
strong presence of public servants in national legislatures. We present a newly compiled data
set on the composition of the rst parliamentary chamber in 76 countries for the years 2000 to
2011. Interestingly, there are large dierences in the fraction of members with a public sector
background. In the UK, for example, the fraction is 23%, while it is 49% in Denmark. Second,
we analyze the determinants of the variation in their presence. In particular, we study legal
provisions that are primarily targeted at the inhibition of conicts of interest; i.e., the dierent
regimes that dene and deal with the (in)compatibility of public service employment with a
mandate in the legislature. Accordingly, data is collected on the (in)compatibility regimes for the
same 76 countries. It is hypothesized that incompatibility provisions reduce the attractiveness
of a political mandate for public servants and are thus related to a lower fraction of them in
parliament. The hypothesis is scrutinized taking alternative institutional determinants as well
as nancial incentives into account. Third, in a supplementary analysis, we study the possible
consequences of a strong presence of public servants in national parliaments on the political
process in terms of government eectiveness and the size of the government sector.
As main results, we nd that the average fraction of politicians with a public sector background
3Both aspects, the conict of interest, for example in budgetary priorities, as well as the problems with
asymmetric information in government oversight relate to Niskanen's (1971) inuential work on the economics
of the bureaucracy. Here, an extension is proposed that takes into account the identity of the politicians who
interact with the government bureaucracy.
4In recent work by Fedele and Naticchioni (2015), public-t individuals are dened as agents who have value
congruence with the public sector environment and market-t individuals as those who have work values and
goals that are market oriented. The former group is assumed to get higher motivational rewards from entering
politics. Approximating public-t type with occupational background, they nd that public servants elected to
parliament are more committed to their parliamentary duties and engage relatively less in moonlighting.
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is 31.3% in our sample. With regard to incompatibility rules, we observe seven countries with
a compatibility regime, 28 countries with a soft incompatibility, and 35 countries with a strict
incompatibility regime. Six countries apply an ineligibility rule. The application of stricter
incompatibility rules (strict incompatibility or ineligibility), signifying higher opportunity costs
of a political mandate, is statistically signicantly related to a smaller fraction of public servants
in parliament by roughly seven percentage points. This dierence is robust when we restrict
the sample to partly free and free democracies. The restrictive eect of incompatibility rules
is also robust to the inclusion of potentially correlated institutional conditions. Moreover, the
results hold if the institutional regimes are coded as indexes. The analysis of the interaction of
the incompatibility regime with the material incentives that potentially aect the cost-benet
calculus of a political career is limited to a reduced sample of countries. While the results
are suggestive, no strong ndings emerge. Regarding the eect on political outcomes, we nd
that the fraction of public servants in parliament is not systematically related to government
eectiveness, but positively correlated with the level of government consumption. The latter
correlation holds if an instrumental variable approach is applied and thus the variation in public
servants in parliament is restricted to the one due to the dierent incompatibility and ineligibility
regimes. The eect is economically sizeable. For a legislature with a seven percentage points
lower presence of public servants, a 1.75 percentage points lower level of government expenditures
is estimated. Additional evidence based on longitudinal data of selected European countries
suggests a similar relationship.
This study contributes to and benets from recent research on the economics of political se-
lection. Important aspects have been modeled in the citizen candidate framework proposed by
Besley and Coate (1997) and Osborne and Slivinski (1996). Fearon (1999), Brennan and Hamlin
(2000), Besley (2005), Mansbridge (2009), and Padovano (2013) provide reviews of some general
ideas on the importance of selection in politcs. Our study particularly contributes to a better
understanding of the institutional determinants of the selection of people with dierent char-
acteristics into politics (see Braendle 2015b for an overview). Previous research along this line
is scarce and scattered. Research on the gender dimension highlights gender quotas (see, e.g.,
Chattopadhyay and Duo 2004 on political reservations in India) or the dierent selection eects
of alternative electoral rules (see Norris and Franklin 1997). Heterogeneity in the competence of
politicians is often approximated by the level of formal education. Better educated politicians
are observed more frequently as leaders in democracies than in autocracies (Besley and Reynal-
Querol 2011). First analyses on the relationship between parties under alternative electoral
rules and the quality of politicians is presented by Mattozzi and Merlo (2011) and Galasso and
Nannicini (2011). Regarding the professional background of politicians, Gehlbach et al. (2010)
nd more businessmen as governors in Russian provinces and republics where there is low media
freedom and government transparency. Rosenson (2006) observes that disclosure rules are asso-
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ciated with a lower presence of businessmen and lawyers in U.S. state legislatures. Van Aaken
and Voigt (2011) nd no such eect at the country level though. Dreher et al. (2009) present
evidence that former entrepreneurs are more likely to implement market-liberalizing reforms as
national leaders. In contrast, lawyer-legislators are less likely to support reforms restricting tort
law in the US (Matter and Stutzer 2015). The political scientists Best and Cotta (2000) address
the long-term trends in the professional composition in several European countries. With regard
to the presence of public servants, they argue that changes over time might have been mainly
induced by changing demands for political competence. In particular, they claim that public
servants are specialists in redistributive politics. We complement this work with a systematic
analysis of institutional conditions specic to candidates with a public sector background. With
the focus on rules of incompatibility as a fundamental facet of the separation of powers principle,
our study is also related to work on this principle pioneered by Persson et al. (1997) and Persson
and Tabellini (2005).
Section 2 presents the rationale for (in)compatibility rules from a historical perspective and
derives hypotheses regarding the presence of public servants in national parliaments. We thereby
also take material incentives into account. In Section 3, we provide a detailed description of the
compiled dataset. Section 4 presents our main econometric analysis of the statistical relationship
between the institutional factors and the political selection of public servants. In Section 5, we
supplement the analysis and study the consequences of a strong presence of public servants for
political outcomes. We adapt a longitudinal perspective for seven countries and a cross country
perspective for our main set of countries. Section 6 oers concluding remarks.
2 The rationale and some history behind (in)compatibility
regimes
In a democracy, government functions are usually assigned to dierent bodies. This separation
of powers is pursued in order to reduce conicts of interest and prevent the abuse of sovereign
authority. Interestingly, the separation of powers principle is implemented rather dierently
with regard to individual people being allowed to hold multiple oces. One major constitutional
decision dealing with inherent (intrapersonal) conicts of interest is the degree of compatibility
of an employment in the public sector with an election to a legislative assembly.5
5Besides, there are also provisions on holding simultaneously dierent elected oces. For example, the logic
of bicameralism excludes the simultaneous holding of a seat in the rst and second chamber of a representative
democracy. The same rationale is sometimes applied to incompatibilities between dierent federal levels (i.e.,
a mandate in the national parliament and in a regional assembly). Some European countries impose the same
rules to prohibit seats being held jointly in the European Parliament and the national assembly. Moreover, the
incompatibility of a ministerial oce and parliamentary duties is the general rule in presidential regimes. It is,
for example, found in countries like Brazil, Portugal, the United States and Switzerland.
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2.1 A short recapitulation of (in)compatibility regimes
Rules that declare employment in the public service incompatible with parliamentary mandates
have been justied for three main reasons.6 First, incompatibility rules should prevent legislative
assemblies from being composed of persons who are subject to government control due to their
ties to the state or their economic dependence on it. This rationale dates back to eighteenth-
century Britain and was aimed at protecting the independence of parliament from the strong
inuence of the crown. In the United Kingdom, this concern is reected in the House of Commons
Disqualication Act of 1975. The latter act constitutes the basis for the ineligibility rule that still
holds today.7 A second motivation for introducing incompatibility or even ineligibility provisions
is the concern that the public service will become politicized by allowing public servants to
assume seats in parliament; where the public service is supposed to be an institution above the
political arena. The enactment of tight restrictions on the political activity of public servants
in the United States, for example, is explained mainly by the desire to maintain the (party-
)political neutrality of the public service. These restrictions date back to the 19th century and
were dened in the Civil Service Act of 1883 for the rst time. These provisions were reassessed
in the Hatch Act which still holds today. In the 20th century, a third reason came up: Rules
of incompatibility should prevent the legislature from being dominated by people with a public
sector background and thus public service interests (Stadelmann et al. 2014).
Today, almost all democracies adhering to the principle of the separation of powers stipulate some
rules of incompatibility in their constitutional provisions. In some countries, there is a movement
to extend this kind of incompatibility rules to occupations beyond the public sector. In France
and Italy, for example, holding a parliamentary mandate is incompatible with being a public
contractor or major supplier of publicly provided goods and services, or being the employee
of a former public enterprise. Such rules mostly apply to management sta. Furthermore, in
some countries incompatibility rules also restrict lawyers from continuously receiving mandates
from public authorities, as is the case in Belgium. There are also countries with legislation
stipulating the incompatibility of a political mandate with employment in foreign enterprises or
international organizations. This is the case in Egypt, for example. In general, however, the
incompatibility rules that aect types of private sector employment constitute exceptions.8
6For a detailed description of the historical evolution of incompatibility rules and for discussions from a
comparative constitutional law perspective, see Tsatsos (1970) and Sturm (1967).
7In some instances, the concern that parliamentarians may become beholden to a government that might
appoint them to certain posts after their term of oce has led to incompatibility rules which are extended beyond
the period of serving as a parliamentarian. Thus, similar arguments apply as is the case of revolving door
arrangements for regulators. In the United States, for example, no member of Congress may be appointed to an
administrative oce that has been created or for which the salary has been granted during his or her term of
oce. A similar incompatibility rule exists in the Philippines.
8For a general discussion of various legal aspects of a parliamentary mandate from a comparative perspective,
see van der Hulst (2000).
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2.2 Selection eects of incompatibility rules
The process of selecting public servants as politicians can be divided into at least three stages
that are linked by institutions and the strategic considerations of the agents involved: The entry
decision of candidates, citizens' decision on whom to vote for and the elected politicians' policy
decisions. In our main analysis, we focus on the rst stage and analyze the conditions under
which candidates with a public service background are allowed to take oce in a legislature and
the conditions they face as members of legislatures. These conditions aect their cost-benet
calculus to run for a parliamentary mandate. The relative attractiveness of political mandates
to public servants compared to private sector candidates is nally reected in the fraction of
public servants in parliament.
The law may declare that parliamentary membership is incompatible with a position in the
public service. This obliges candidates, once elected, to relinquish their public service oce.
If public servants face an ineligibility rule, they are obliged to resign prior to running for the
political mandate and risk having neither a seat in the legislative assembly nor a position in the
public service. This increases the opportunity cost of running for a political mandate.
In contrast to ineligibility, rules of incompatibility constitute weaker restrictions. With strict
incompatibility, all public servants have to hold their oce in abeyance but may remain in oce
until they are elected for a mandate; they often have guaranteed reemployment (in varying
degrees) subsequent to the termination of their mandate.9
With soft incompatibility, only some categories of public servants are restricted, whereas all other
public servants can further pursue their public service career, often with a guaranteed reduced
workload. Some countries conne incompatibilities only to specic public oces, regardless of
the rank in the hierarchy. In other countries, the restriction aects only high-ranking public
servants. While strict incompatibility increases the opportunity costs for all public servants, soft
incompatibility increases costs only for some of them.
If a compatibility regime is applied, public servants elected to the legislature are free to juggle
with their job in the public sector. In most cases, they face favorable conditions in terms of pay
and time.
In sum, we expect that the opportunity costs for public servants running for a political mandate
are higher if stricter incompatibility rules are applied. Accordingly, we expect to nd the smallest
9In some countries, public servants facing incompatibility restrictions are compensated with specic privileges.
Guaranteed reemployment is the most important and widespread one. In France, for example, public servants,
once elected to parliament, get a special status (position de detachment) which assures that they can return to
a position (at least) equivalent to the one they left. Another privilege is the compensation for holding a public
oce in abeyance. Further specic privileges are discussed in Braendle and Stutzer (2010) for the institutional
context of the German subnational parliaments.
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fraction of citizens with a public sector background elected to parliaments in countries where
ineligibility rules are in force.
2.3 Interaction of incompatibility rules and material incentives
There are potentially numerous other forces that might help to explain why the incentives for the
self-selection into politics dier between people from dierent sectors. Moreover, these factors
might also interact with the (in)compatibility regimes. While the compensation of a political
mandate seems an obvious one, the dierential eects on the attractiveness of a political career
for people from dierent sectors are not straightforward. The literature so far concentrates on
whether higher pay attracts better educated politicians10 and on general aspects of remuner-
ation.11 Moreover, ocial pay might only be part of the material compensation if politicians
can extract bribes. However, some initial hypotheses can still be derived on material incentives,
sector-specic selection and the interaction with (in)compatibility regimes.
a) Ocial pay: If public servants are more likely to live o their salary as public sector em-
ployees than people from the private sector, public servants can \aord" a political career less
if politicians' compensation is low. Accordingly, a more generous compensation attracts more
candidates from the public sector. Eventually, this is reected in a larger fraction of public
servants in politics in a country which oers higher ocial pay to its parliamentarians ceteris
paribus. If the compensation matters for the sector-specic attractiveness of a political career, a
dierential eect of the (in)compatibility regime is to be expected. With low pay and few public
servants in politics, the regime is of limited relevance. However, with high pay and a potentially
large fraction of public servants in parliament, a strict incompatibility (or even an ineligibility)
rule has the potential to substantially lower the presence of public servants.
b) Illegal compensation from corruption: A similar reasoning is possible if politicians from the
private sector have more opportunities to strike corrupt deals and to benet from bribes. In an
environment with low corruption, politics is relatively less attractive for people from the private
sector and public servants hold a larger fraction of political mandates. A strict incompatibility
regime bites and has comparatively large eects on the presence of public servants. In contrast,
in a country with widespread corruption, the (in)compatibility regime is expected to matter less.
c) Relative income between people employed in the public and the private sector: The nan-
cial attractiveness of jobs across sectors is one component of the opportunity costs involved in
10This aspect is theoretically analyzed by Caselli and Morelli (2004) as well as Messner and Pohlborn (2004),
and empirically studied by Braendle (2015a), Ferraz and Finan (2009), Fisman et al. (2015), Gagliarducci and
Nannicini (2013), and Kotakorpi and Poutvaara (2010). The theoretically modeled countervailing forces echo the
mixed empirical results.
11See, for example, the work on outside earnings (Gagliarducci et al. 2010) or post oce returns (Diermeier et
al. 2005, Eggers and Hainmueller 2009).
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pursuing a political career. In particular in countries with comparatively low salaries in the
public sector, a political mandate is attractive for its members. Accordingly, we would expect
to see a larger fraction of public servants in parliament and also larger dampening eects of an
incompatibility or ineligibility regime.
We address these complementary hypotheses at the end of Section 3.2.
3 Data
The empirical analysis is based on a newly collected dataset. It captures the fraction of public
servants in 76 national parliaments for recent elections between 2000 and 2011 and the rules
of (in)compatibility applied in the respective countries. Other data used in this study are
introduced sequentially. For an overview, see Table A.4 in the Appendix.
3.1 Occupational composition of national legislatures
For election periods between 2000 and 2010, the Inter-Parliamentary Union (IPU) published
many occupational statistics in the annual series Chronicle of Parliamentary Elections. The
series is based on information supplied by parliamentary information services, whereby the IPU
tries to make the information comparable across countries.12 We took the fraction of public
servants in parliament for 66 countries from this source. The series was discontinued in 2011.
For another ten parliaments, we collected data from parliamentary online services if they oered
systematic information about individual politicians' professions prior to entering parliament.
Out of these ten countries, we complied our information based on individual MP's entries for
Canada, Finland, Ireland, Israel and Spain. For the U.S., no systematic information on the oc-
cupational background of the members of congress is available. We therefore coded information
retrieved from various sources; i.e., in particular, the homepage of individual parliamentarians
and the internet site votesmart.org. Whenever more detailed information was available on the
national parliamentary service web pages, we gave it priority over the information supplied by
the IPU. We consider the following occupational titles as public servants or employees of the pub-
lic sector: teacher, professor, educational profession, researcher, scientist, civil or public servant
and employee of the local, state or federal authority administration, judge, public prosecutor,
employee of the judiciary, armed services or military, police ocial, social worker, and employee
of a public enterprise (if indicated). Two typical examples for the IPU statistics present the
occupational composition of the United Kingdom House of Commons elected in 2005 in Table
12The IPU typically reports country-specic statistics for dierent occupations within the public service. We
aggregate these subcategories.
9
A.1a and the Algerian parliament elected in 2007 in Table A.1b.13 For the United Kingdom,
the statistics indicate that 140 out of 615 members (i.e., a fraction of 22.8%) have a public
service occupational background. Of these members, 98 hold a position in the educational or
research sector. 28 indicate a prior employment in the public administration and 14 members
indicate military service or police service as occupation held prior to entering parliament. The
background of the other 475 members is linked to eleven categories in the private sector, one
category of professions related to political activities and one category for others. More detailed
information oers the occupational statistics of the German parliamentary online service for the
17th German parliament (Bundestag) elected in 2009 (see Table A.1c in the Appendix). It indi-
cates that 199 out of 622 members (i.e., a fraction of 32%), have a public sector background. Of
these 199 members, 86 (43.2%) hold a position in the educational and research sector. The other
113 members hold the following functions: administration (62 members or 31.2%), judiciary (13
members or 6.5%), municipal public servants (13 members or 6.5%), medical professions (9
members or 4.5%), police (7 members or 3.5%), military service (3 members or 1.5%) and 3%
execute other functions in the public service.
On average, the fraction of public servants elected to the 76 national parliaments in our sample
is 31.3%. This number takes into account that in many statistics there is a category of parlia-
mentarians with unknown professional background. The adjusted fraction is expressed relative
to those politicians whose occupation is specied. The unadjusted or raw fraction is 29.4% in
the sample. The fraction is lowest in Singapore in 2001 with 6.5% (unadj. 6%) and highest
in Djibouti in 2008 with 73.9%. A complete list of the data sources and the fraction of public
servants for every country is provided in Table A.2 in the Appendix.
In collecting and compiling data on the fraction of public servants in parliament, we encountered
several methodological challenges. First, existing statistics on the socio-economic composition
of parliaments dier as to their intended purpose. In contrast to our study, which concentrates
on the last occupation held before election to parliament, some national statistics focus more on
educational background, or occupation learned.14 Second, if the statistics did not contain one
coherent category for the public sector, we had to rearrange or to aggregate categories in order
to gain comparable data. A frequent case is separate categories for members of parliament who
are from the judicial branch, the administration, the education or the public security sector.
Due to the variation in the degree of dierentiation, we abstained from a rened data collection
and generated aggregate data on the fraction of public servants.
13The information about the United Kingdom House of Commons is very similar to the one provided by the
national parliamentary service.
14This is, e.g., the case for Canada, Bulgaria and Slovenia. In the case of Canada, we were able to retrieve the
necessary information for our study based on the investigation of individual MPs' curricula vitae.
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3.2 Institutional conditions
Rules of incompatibility are either written down in the national constitution, the electoral law
or in one of the various laws governing the parliament, the judiciary and the public service.
We are not aware of any study that systematically compares (in)compatibility regimes across
countries. For the present study, we mainly collected and coded information provided by the
IPU. Where no information was available (or where the information was contradictory), we
looked for national provisions as far as information was available in English, German, Italian,
or Spanish. We coded four dierent types of (in)compatibility or ineligibility regimes:
Ineligibility is given if all or most occupational categories of public servants have to resign from
public service when they decide to become a candidate.
Strict incompatibility is given if all public servants have to hold their oce in abeyance while in
parliament.
Soft incompatibility is given if (some) broader occupational categories of public servants have to
hold their oce in abeyance while in parliament. Broader categories of public servants involve;
e.g, senior public ocials, judges and personal of the judicial branch, police ocials and members
of the army, or educational professionals.
Compatibility is given if public servants elected to parliament may stay in their public service
oce. We also code a system a compatibility regime if only single and particular positions are
covered by incompatibility provisions, such as judge at the constitutional court, head of the
parliamentary information services, or head of the audit court.
Table A.3 in the Appendix gives an overview of the institutional conditions holding in each
country as well as the data sources. Table S.1 in the Supplementary Material provides the
underlying institutional information.
Three challenges in collecting the data on the incompatibility regimes have to be mentioned.
First, the countries' information supplied to the IPU diers in detailedness. We therefore limit
our main coding to four general regimes (but see the alternative regime indexes applied in the
robustness analysis). Second, the ineligibility regimes, for example, in the U.S. and in the UK
are not covering all public servants. In the UK, ineligibility does not apply to educational
professions, arguably an important group within the public service. In the U.S., the rules which
dene ineligibility are not fully transparent. Miller (2010) presents anecdotal evidence that the
ambiguities about the coverage of the Hatch Act are abused by incumbents to deter potential
competitors. They threaten them with the loss of their public service position at the local or
state level. A priori it is dicult to judge whether strict incompatibility for all public servants has
overall a more restrictive eect on the political selection of public servants than an ineligibility
rule with legal uncertainty and/or exceptions for particular positions in the public sector. Third,
depending on the rule of law, the enforcement of incompatibility rules might dier. We address
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this issue in the empirical analysis restricting the sample to more democratic countries with a
supposedly stronger adherence to the rule of law.
4 Results of the empirical analysis
The presentation of results starts with some descriptive evidence. In order to deal with correlated
and confounding factors that might drive the raw correlation, the remainder of this section then
focuses on the partial correlations from multiple regressions between institutional conditions
for public servants as members of parliament and their actual presence in them. We report the
results for a series of estimation specications in order to uncover as much information as possible
about our data pool. In a rst step, we present the results for the dierent regimes restricting
the sample once to \at least partly free democracies" and once to \free democracies" (according
to the democracy rating published by Freedom House). Regarding the second step, we test the
robustness of our results including and excluding various institutional control variables. Next,
we look at the interaction of material incentives and incompatibility regimes. In particular, we
study the parliamentary wage, corruption and the relative wage between the private and the
public sector. Finally, we report the results of a robustness check based on alternative regime
indexes.
4.1 Descriptive evidence
(In)compatibility regimes are expected to modify the attractiveness of a political mandate for
public servants and thus to systematically aect the (self-)selection of citizens with dierent
professional backgrounds into national parliaments. First evidence is presented in Figure 1. It
shows the fraction of public servants elected to parliament under dierent (in)compatibility
regimes in the period 2000-2011. Consistent with the theoretical hypothesis, the stricter the
applied incompatibility rule, the smaller is the presence of public servants in parliament. For
the compatibility regime, we observe an average fraction of public servants in parliament of
41.4% in the full sample. With soft incompatibility, the respective fraction is 32.8%. With
strict incompatibility or ineligibility, it is 28.4%, and 29.5% respectively. A similar but more
pronounced picture emerges if we restrict the sample either to at least partly free democracies
or to free democracies. For instance, in the latter sample the fraction of public servants in
parliament is 44.2% on average under a compatibility regime, 26.2% with strict incompatibility
and only 24.8% with ineligibility.
[ Figure 1 about here ]
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4.2 Basic regressions
Table 1 presents the basic results in a regression framework applying ordinary least squares
estimations. Due to the challenges regarding the denition of (in)eligibility rules, we present
results both for the disaggregated regime indicator as well as for the dichotomous one that
compares strict incompatibility or ineligbility regimes to compatibility and soft incompatibility
regimes. Results in columns I and II are based on the full sample of 76 countries. In correspon-
dence with Figure 1, a soft incompatibility regime is related to a 11.1 percentage points smaller
fraction of public servants in parliament than a compatibility regime (i.e., the reference regime).
For strict incompatibility the coecient is -15.8 percentage points, and for ineligibility the
coecient is -15.5 percentage points, respectively. These eects are quantitatively substantial
and statistically precisely measured. In both specications the log of GDP per capita in 2005
as a control variable for economic development and the Freedom House democracy rating of
2000 as a control for the development of democratic institutions in general are included. Both
control variables show no clear correlation with the fraction of public servants in national
parliaments. In columns III and IV, we restrict our sample to \at least partly free democracies"
and in V and VI to \free democracies" according to the Freedom House democracy rating. We
expect a stronger adherence to the rule of law in more democratic regimes. Correspondingly,
the enforcement of political institutions in general, and of incompatibility rules in particular, is
expected to be more stringent in the restricted sample of countries. The estimations conrm the
negative partial correlations between the strictness of the incompatibility rule and the presence
of public servants. Looking at the dichotomous regime indicator in columns II, IV and VI,
we nd that a strict incompatibility regime or ineligibility regime is statistically signicantly
related to a smaller presence of public servants in parliament by about seven percentage points
(the reference being a compatibility or soft incompatibility regime).
[ Table 1 about here ]
4.3 Alternative institutional determinants of political selection
In Table 2, we analyze whether the (in)compatibility regimes are just place holders for other
specic institutions (observed and unobserved), which are the actual drivers of occupation-
specic political selection. As a benchmark, column I repeats the ndings for the baseline
estimation. We concentrate on the form of government, the electoral system, freedom of the
press, disclosure rules, and legal origins. The variables are described in detail in Table A.4 in
the Appendix.
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a) Presidential and parliamentary systems adopt dierent approaches to the separation of powers
and the checks and balances between them. In particular, in a presidential system the head of
the executive branch is directly elected, and citizens can vote for dierent parties for the two
branches in order to have a so-called divided government. However, they might also elect less
public servants to curb the inuence of the executive branch. If the indirect inuence of the
president on the legislature via elected public servants is meant to be restricted institutionally,
this might take the form of a strict incompatibility or even an ineligibility regime.
Estimation II tests for an independent eect of the (in)compatibility regime on the presence
of public servants. The form of government is captured based on a presidential system in-
dicator provided by Persson and Tabellini (2005) and extended on the basis of Borman and
Golder (2013). Out of our country sample with 76 observations, 17 countries are categorized
as presidential regimes. The results for the full sample in column II indicate a robust eect of
the (in)compatibility regimes and a smaller fraction of public servants present in presidential
systems. However, the latter eect is not statistically signicant.
b) The electoral system is often characterized by the rule that translates votes into seats; i.e.,
either a plurality rule or a proportional representation rule, and the district magnitude; i.e., the
number of politicians who acquire a seat in an electoral district. The two aspects are related as
proportional representation systems tend to have larger electoral districts or even just a single
nation-wide electoral district. Majority voting systems are more often characterized by single-
member districts. Smaller electoral districts are likely to be more candidate-centered rather
than party-centered, thus increasing the barriers to enter the political competition (Persson and
Tabellini 2005).15
In a majority voting system, public servants who aspire to a political career might be in an
advantageous position relative to competitors from the private sector. This is the case if they
have already gained some (local) prominence due to their position in the public service (for
instance, as senior ocial, judge or university professor). While this may also hold for some
trial lawyers or entrepreneurs, the former group might particularly benet from exible work
conditions and a secure salary during their campaign. According to these arguments, a larger
fraction of public servants is expected to be present in national parliaments. However, if a
15Term limits might be another institution that aects the costs and benets of a political career and thus
potentially the dierential selection across professions (see Lopez 2003 on the causes and consequences of term
limits in general). It can be hypothesized that term limits decrease the payo from engaging in politics and
increase the economic risks associated with a political career. This is particularly relevant for public servants'
competitors from the private sector as they often face less favorable conditions of re-employment after a political
career than public servants (except for the case of an ineligibility regime). Accordingly, term limits are expected
to increase the presence of public servants in politics. To the best of our knowledge, however, term limits are
rarely applied to legislatures at the national level (but focus on presidents). An empirical application might be
possible for U.S. states.
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candidacy in a majority voting system or in a small electoral district requires more resources,
public servants might be at a disadvantage relative; e.g., to businessmen and lawyers from the
private sector.
Information on the voting rule and district magnitude is taken from Norris (2009) and the
data base on political institutions (DPI) provided by the World Bank for the year 2005. The
latter variable ranges from 1 in systems with pure single-member districts to 150 in the Slovak
Republic, where there are 150 parliamentary seats and a single country-wide electoral district.
For 69 out of 76 countries in our data set, this information is available with an average of 14.6.
Taking into account either aspect of the electoral system in columns III and IV, the eects of
the (in)compatibility regimes remain robust. The stricter the applied regime is, the smaller is
the presence of public servant in parliament. For countries with a majority voting system, a
statistically signicantly larger presence of public servants by about 6.6 percentage points is
observed in parliament. For countries with larger electoral districts, no conclusion can be drawn
given the imprecisely measured partial correlation.
c) Generally relevant for political selection are institutions that increase the transparency in
politics. Some of them are reected in a free and politically independent press. A free press
disseminates more politically relevant information in general and more information concerning
the background and the potential (mis-)behavior of politicians in particular. This should ease
and improve the political selection process whereby it is ex ante open whether candidates from
the public or the private sector benet. We take an index from Freedom House to measure
freedom of the press. We nd in column V that more press freedom is positively related to
the fraction of public servants present across parliaments. The partial correlations for the
(in)compatibility regime variables remain robust.
Disclosure rules are another set of institutions that aect transparency. If politicians have to
disclose the sources of their outside income, a political mandate might become less attractive.
This might, in particular, hold for public servants' competitors from the private sector; e.g.,
lawyers and businessmen. In order to control for this potentially correlated institutional feature
of legislatures, we include a disclosure rule index for income sources (Djankov et al. 2010) in the
regression estimation in column VI. Contrary to the reasoning, we nd no eect. The eects for
the (in)compatibility variables are almost unchanged.
d) There are potentially many more democratic institutions that aect the (self-)selection of
public servants into national parliaments - institutions that might also be correlated with the
(in)compatibility regimes. If these institutions are part of a bundle of institutions that follow a
specic legal tradition, we can control for these unobserved factors by including legal origins as
control variables (La Porta et al. 2008). Column VII reports the results. As to legal origin, no
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clear picture emerges. In any case, legal origin does not explain the negative partial correlations
for strict incompatibility and ineligibility.16
[ Table 2 about here ]
4.4 Interaction of material incentives and incompatibility rules
Table 3 presents the ndings for a set of rened hypotheses taking into account material incen-
tives to pursue a political career.
a) In order to test the hypothesis that a more generous remuneration of a parliamentary mandate
is particularly attractive for public servants, we collected information on parliamentary wages
for 29 countries. These data refer to the base remuneration.17 In order to make the information
comparable across countries, we set the base remuneration in relation to a country's GDP per
capita. The ratio ranges from 0.78 in Switzerland to 7.76 in Romania.
According to the specication in column I, a higher remuneration seems - in contrast to our
expectation - negatively, though not statistically signicantly correlated with the presence of
public servants in politics. In line with our extended hypothesis, the eect of a stricter in-
compatibility regime seems stronger for countries with a comparatively higher parliamentary
compensation. Figure A.1 in the Appendix depicts the marginal eects of a strict incompati-
bility regime conditional on parliamentary remuneration as implied by the results in column II.
For higher parliamentary compensation, a stricter regime seems to reduce the presence of public
servants in parliament more. However, these estimates come with a wide condence band and
do not allow strong conclusions.
b) The possibility to strike deals in a corrupt environment is expected to make a political
mandate more attractive for people from the private sector. For the empirical test, we rely
on the standardized measure of corruption from Kaufmann et al. (2008). Consistent with the
expectation, we nd a smaller presence of public servants when corruption is widespread. The
results in column III imply that in a country that is more corrupt by one standard deviation, the
fraction of public servants is statistically signicantly lower by 6.46 percentage points. Contrary
to our hypothesis, the eect of the strict incompatibility or ineligibility regime seems not to
systematically depend on the level of corruption according to the results in column IV. Figure
A.2 in the Appendix provides a graphical representation of the marginal eects.
16We nd rather similar results for the specications in Table 2 if we restrict the sample to \at least partly free
democracies". The results are presented in Table A.5 in the Appendix.
17For several member countries of the European Union, we rely on the information provided by Corbett et al.
(2005). For Australia, Canada, Norway, Peru, Switzerland and the United States, data are from the national
parliamentary ocial web pages.
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c) The opportunity costs of a political career in terms of the foregone compensation in the sector
of original employment are approximated and taken into account in the estimations in columns
V and VI. Thereby data on relative salaries for 28 countries are from the ILO. In contrast to
our expectation that a comparatively more attractive private sector makes it easier and more
attractive for pubic servants to pursue a political career, the salary of an accountant relative
to a teacher does not statistically signicantly positively enter into the estimation. In order
to allow a simple interpretation of the estimation with the interaction eect in column VI, the
ratio for the relative salary is adjusted by subtracting one. This leads to a variable ranging from
-0.11 to 2.23 and mean 0.63. In line with the nding for the parliamentary base remuneration,
a stricter (in)compatibility regime reduces the fraction of public servants in politics more where
the material conditions seem to favor their presence in parliament. However, given the large
standard errors of the estimation, the result has to be considered with caution. Figure A.3 in
the Appendix presents the marginal eects implied by the estimation in column VI.
[ Table 3 about here ]
4.5 Robustness analysis based on alternative regime indexes
In a supplementary analysis, we calculated regime indexes trying to capture the fractions of
potential candidates from the public sector that are covered by institutional restrictions of
incompatibility or ineligibility. Instead of characterizing the regime in a country as such, we
thus determine the fractions of compatible, incompatible, and ineligible public servants. We
rely on the specic information about the dierent institutional conditions for various categories
of public servants across countries as available and listed in Table S.1 in the Supplementary
Material. The dierent categories are roughly weighted according to their presence in national
legislatures that apply a compatibility regime for all the public servants (see the Supplementary
Material for more details).
The robustness checks for the specications in Tables 1 to 3 including the incompatibility index as
well as the ineligibility index (with compatibility being the reference regime) reveal qualitatively
as well as quantitatively similar results. If 100% of public servants are incompatible, their
presence in parliament is estimated to be between 7 and 8 percentage points lower than if
everybody is compatible. If 100% are ineligible, the respective fraction of public servants is
between 7 and 9 percentage points lower. Table S.2 in the Supplementary Material presents
these main results. Tables S.3 and S. 4 document the robustness if additional institutional
variables and material incentives are taken into account.
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4.6 Summary
Whether we take additional institutional determinants or the interaction with material incentives
into account or apply an alternative regime indicator, the dierent (in)compatibility regimes are
correlated with the fraction of public servants in a statistically robust way. The ndings in-
dicate that stricter incompatibility rules increase the opportunity costs of a political mandate
for public servants and thus systematically aect political selection into national parliaments.
These ndings are theoretically and quantitatively consistent with the results obtained in Braen-
dle and Stutzer (2010) for the subfederal level in a single country; i.e., the German Laender.
In a time-series cross-sectional analysis, it is found that institutional restrictions in terms of
incompatibility rules substantially reduce the selection of public servants into parliament and
that institutionally granted privileges increase the fraction of public servants. While their lon-
gitudinal framework allows a dierences-in-dierences approach, the analysis is restricted to the
introduction of incompatibility regimes. Here, the evidence is based on a much wider variation
in (in)compatibility regimes and for rather dierent institutional environments.
5 Consequences for political outcomes
5.1 Public servants as legislators
A strong presence of public servants in parliament raises countervailing arguments regarding
its possible consequences for government eectiveness and government size. On the one hand,
there is the concern for conicts of interest that rests on the personal union and aliations
between the legislative and executive body as well as the perk of guaranteed reemployment.
In particular, the private interests of public servants might lead to slack that is less forcefully
counteracted by committees that are largely composed of public servants.18 A case in point
is their involvement in drafting and revising civil service law. Moreover, public servants are
likely to have an information advantage with regard to legislative procedures. This allows for
more leeway to manoeuvre, especially in areas they are professionally acquainted with such
as administration, security, public nance, or education. Related to Niskanen's theory of the
bureaucracy (1971), especially senior ocials elected to parliament might systematically sway
legislative decisions in favor of expansionary public sector budgets when they expect to return to
their previous senior ocial position in the public sector.19 As proponents and representatives of
18Couch et al. (1992) point in this direction. For Alabama, they nd that public funding per student at
the junior and senior colleges that employ legislators as educators is signicantly higher than that received by
comparable institutions.
19This is not to say that other members of parliament would not also pursue their own goals (and thus experience
conicts of interest). However, the authority of the legislature with regard to the duties of the public sector and
the conditions governing public service are more concrete and immediate than for the private sector. Many aspects
18
the public service, public servants may also favor policy choices that grant more competencies to
the state and provide more services through the public sector, resulting in a larger government
sector. A strong presence of public servants in parliament is thus expected to result in lower
government eectiveness and a larger public sector.
On the other hand, however, politics is more than a platform for the exchange of private in-
terests. This perspective takes into account the expert knowledge possessed by public servants
and their ties with the state that might rather contribute to productive policy choices in par-
liament. The vocation of a career in the public service might reect particular loyalty to an
organization set up to provide public services. Given that public servants enjoy institutional
privileges, such as reemployment guarantees and often favorable terms for leave of absence, they
might be considered relatively independent of outside pressure and free to dedicate themselves
to parliamentary duties until the end of their mandate. These aspects of the presence of public
servants in parliament are particularly attractive if the information asymmetry between the ex-
ecutive and the legislative branch is severe (as emphasized by Niskanen 1971). Electing insiders
to parliament who become accountable to the electorate might consequently help to align inter-
ests between principals and agents. One eect might be stricter parliamentary oversight, since
public servants face lower control costs due to their experience and information advantage (for a
detailed discussion see Braendle and Stutzer 2013). The increased oversight activity induces the
government and its subordinate public service to provide public goods and services more e-
ciently. According to this line of reasoning, public servants as legislators have a positive impact
on the execution of sovereign authority. A stronger presence of public servants in parliament is
thus expected to increase government eectiveness and decrease the waste of public funds.
Overall, the net eect of a strong presence of public servants in legislative assemblies on political
outcomes is theoretically open and invites an explorative empirical investigation.
5.2 Empirical analysis
Following the theoretical reasoning, we analyze the statistical relationship between the presence
of public servants in parliament and broad measures for political outcomes. In a rst step, we
relate the long run development of the presence of public servants in parliament with government
nal consumption for selected countries. In a second step, we analyze the relationship between
the presence of public servants in parliament and a) government eectiveness and b) government
consumption in a cross-country perspective. We present two estimation specications for both
are more explicitly and more comprehensively regulated than in any other regulated market. While there are
specic ordinances, e.g., regulating the business of pharmacies or the fees of attorneys, there are a multitude
of laws and ordinances regulating the public service such as its internal training, pay, pension scheme and legal
status.
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outcome measures. The rst studies the correlation based on a multiple regression including
standard control variables from previous research. The second applies an instrumental variable
approach taking information about the (in)compatibility regimes into account on the rst stage.
A longitudinal perspective
Little is known about the presence of public servants in parliaments over time across countries.
In order to address this gap, pioneering work had been undertaken by the research consortium
compiling the data basis for the compendium on parliamentary representatives in Europe edited
by Best and Cotta (2000). We draw on this data source and relate the fraction of public
servants observed in seven European countries to the respective development in government
nal consumption (in % of GDP). The latter data series compiled by the World Bank starts in
1961.
Figure 2 presents the long-term relationship for Denmark, Finland, France, Italy, the Nether-
lands, Norway and the United Kingdom.20 In all the countries but Denmark, the fraction of
public servants increased between 1961 and the years around 2000 as is the case for govern-
ment nal consumption. The increase in government expenditure over this time period was
particularly large in Denmark, which had already back in 1961 a fraction of public servants in
parliament that was close to 50%.
[ Figure 2 about here ]
A cross-country perspective
Columns I and II in Table 4 report the correlations between the parliamentary presence of public
servants and government eectiveness based on an index from Kaufmann et al. (2008). This in-
dex synthesizes a rich base of data which capture the perceptions of the quality of public services.
Based on the OLS estimation, no clear partial correlation between the two variables is found.
The specication also includes the log of GDP per capita and the Freedom House democracy
rating. These indicators for economic development and democracy are statistically signicantly
related to more government eectiveness. In addition, the sum of exports and imports as a
percentage of GDP and the legal origin of a country's legal system are included. The former
variable serves as a proxy for the extent of openness to foreign competition. The coecients of
the control variables are consistent with prior results in empirical research. Together, the factors
account for 88.7% of the variation in the dependent variable.
Note that the partial correlation for the fraction of public servants might well be the result of a
causal relationship running from perceived government eectiveness to political selection rather
than the direction discussed in the theoretical part. In particular, candidates from the public
20Detailed graphs are presented in Figure S.1 in the Supplementary Online Material.
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sector might get more electoral support in countries that have a relatively higher quality of
public services. In this situation, an instrumental variable approach is recommended. However,
we are not aware of an ideal instrument with which to perform our preferred analysis separating
the selection channel from potentially other channels and reversed causation. Instead, we
take the variables covering the soft incompatibility regime, the strict incompatibility and the
ineligibility regime as instruments. We do this assuming that there is no direct institutional
eect on government eectiveness. The eect is rather indirect. As analyzed in the Sections 2
and 4, the incompatibility regime indicators are theoretically and empirically strong predictors
of the presence of public servants in parliament. In addition, the incompatibility of a public
service oce with a parliamentary mandate can be considered a long-standing institution that
is basically unrelated to current political outcomes. Column II presents the results of the second
stage of the two-stage least squares estimation at the top and the partial correlation for the
instrument at the bottom.21 If we only exploit the variation in the presence of public servants
that is due to the (in)compatibility regimes, we nd no statistically signicant partial correlation.
[ Table 4 about here ]
Columns III and IV show the results for general government nal consumption as a share
of GDP. We take the average over the years 2000 to 2008 in order to smooth out short-run
shocks to the supply and demand for public goods. We nd that the adjusted fraction of
public servants is strongly and statistically signicantly positively correlated with government
consumption. In countries with a 10 percentage points higher presence of public servants,
government consumption is about 2 percentage points higher. We thereby control for four
further predictors of the size of government: openness to trade, two demographic variables that
capture the fraction of the population under 15 and over 65 years of age, and an indicator of
ethnic fractionalization. The four variables have been identied as basic variables in empirical
research on government size (see, e.g., Shelton 2007).
Obviously, a larger government also oers a larger pool of political candidates and more voters
potentially favoring candidates with a public service background. The partial correlation for
the fraction of public servants might thus reect eects in both directions. Again a two-stage
estimation approach is recommended. The partial correlation in column IV for the fraction
of public servants is based on the variation that is due to dierences in the (in)compatibility
regimes. A positive and statistically signicant eect of a slightly bigger size is estimated.22
21The results for the further variables in the rst stage regression are as follows (standard errors in parentheses):
0.192 x ln(GDP per capita) (1.475) - 2.01 x democracy rating (1.397) - 0.032 x trade (% of GDP) (0.032) - 1.333
x UK legal origin (4.124) - 1.064 x German legal origin (4.969) + 6.167 x Scandinavian legal origin (9.152).
22The results for the further variables on the rst stage are as follows (standard errors in brackets): + 2.475
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In sum, the phenomenon of a strong presence of public servants in parliament seems not system-
atically correlated with government eectiveness. However, it seems to be a signicant driver of
government consumption. The instrumental variable estimation implies that in a country with
a strict incompatibility or ineligibility regime (and thus roughly a seven percentage points lower
fraction of public servants in parliament) government nancial consumption expenditure (in %
of GDP) is lower by about 1.75 percentage points. This is substantial given the average level of
16.78% in our sample of countries.
6 Concluding remarks
In this paper, we adopt a comparatively person-centered view of the political process. We argue
that the individual characteristics of politicians matter for public policy choices and govern-
ment outcomes. This contrasts with the reasoning of many political philosophers and political
economists that good governance is (solely) the result of institutions which allow holding politi-
cians accountable for their behavior. According to this latter view, it is useless to call for more
competent and honest politicians in order to remedy malfunctions such a low quality of public
services.
Obviously, the two views are not mutually exclusive. As political control and the credibility
of policy commitments are always limited, a careful selection of representatives is important to
bring the outcomes of the political process closer in line with citizens' preferences when delegating
decision-making power. We think that a comparative institutional analysis of political selection
bridges the two views and emphasizes questions that have been neglected so far in political
economics. First, which are the institutions that systematically aect political selection; i.e.,
the composition of the pool of politicians with regard to identity or quality? Second, are there
consequences for political outcomes stemming from institutions that are primarily set up with
the intention of holding politicians accountable? On the one hand, institutions which focus on
reducing agency problems might not only tame the potential misbehavior of politicians in oce,
but also deter some citizens from entering politics in the rst place; for instance, those citizens
who seek to abuse their political power for private interests. Some outcome observations from
the political process that are attributed to accountability mechanisms might thus, in fact, be
due to political selection. On the other hand, an emphasis on control mechanisms could also
backre if it systematically changes the pool of candidates for the worse.
The incompatibility of a public sector position with a political mandate is one such institution. It
x ln(GDP per capita) (1.754) - 1.936 x democracy rating (1.403) - 0.022 x trade (% of GDP) (0.032) + 0.779 x
population under 15 years (%)(0.391) + 0.714 x population over 65 years (0.727) + 3.673 x ethnic fractionalization
(8.097).
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is introduced in various forms to prevent conicts of interest and thus to reduce agency problems.
We have argued that this institution also systematically changes the pool of available candidates
and elected politicians because a strict incompatibility regime increases the opportunity costs
incurred by public servants when pursuing political mandates. Our main analysis is consistent
with this hypothesis. We nd in a cross-country analysis based on a novel dataset that, on
average, there are seven percentage points fewer public servants in parliaments in which a strict
incompatibility or an ineligibility regime is applied. This eect is robust to the inclusion of other
potential institutional determinants of political selection as well as to the interaction with the
material attractiveness of a political mandate and of a position in the private compared to the
public sector.
In a supplementary study on the consequences for political outcomes, the fraction of public
servants in parliament is not systematically related to government eectiveness. However, there
is an economically signicant positive correlation with government expenditure. Importantly,
the correlation holds in an instrumental variable estimation that exploits only the variation in
the presence of public servants that is due to countries' incompatibility and ineligibility regime.
For a seven percentage points higher fraction of public servants (roughly the dierence if a
compatibility or soft incompatibility regime is in place rather than a stricter one), government
nancial consumption expenditure (in % of GDP) is higher by about 1.75 percentage points.
This is a rst hint that the presence of public servants in parliament is potentially a strong force
that moves major policy variables.
Future research will have to explore the specic consequences for politics that the selection of
public servants into parliaments might have. These complementary insights are indispensable
for a comprehensive understanding of (in)compatibility rules. Moreover, they will provide evi-
dence supporting constitutional decisions on how to develop and implement legislation on the
separation of powers.
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Figures and Tables
Figure 1: (In)compatibility regimes and the fraction of public servants in national parliaments
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Figure 2: Public servants and government expenditure in seven European countries over time
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Table 4: Presence of public servants and government eectiveness and goverment size
Dependent variable: Government eectiveness Government size
I II III IV
Adjusted fraction of public servants {0.000 {0.014 0.212*** 0.250**
(0.00) (0.01) (0.04) (0.10)
Ln(GDP per capita) 0.409*** 0.410*** 0.122 0.033
(0.04) (0.04) (0.51) (0.56)
Democracy rating 0.186*** 0.165*** 0.355 0.399
(0.04) (0.05) (0.41) (0.43)
Trade openess 0.002* 0.001 0.001 0.002
(0.00) (0.00) (0.01) (0.01)
UK legal origin 0.219* 0.186
(0.12) (0.13)
German legal origin 0.061 0.074
(0.14) (0.16)
Scandinavian legal origin 0.545** 0.718**
(0.25) (0.33)
Population under 65 years (%) 0.068 0.042
(0.12) (0.14)
Population over 65 years (%) 0.404* 0.385*
(0.22) (0.23)
Ethnic fractionalization {0.765 {0.884
(2.40) (2.44)
No. of observations 71 71 67 67
R2 0.887 0.861 0.447 0.438
Prob: > F 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.007
First stage
Soft incompatibility -8.899 -12.749**
(6.28) (6.18)
Strict incompatibility -12.852** -16.700***
(6.19) (5.98)
Ineligibility -14.896* -21.700**
(8.52) (8.46)
Notes: Columns I and III: OLS estimations. Columns II and IV: 2SLS instrumental variable estimations. Stan-
dard errors in parentheses. The fraction of public servants is instrumented by the variables soft incompatibility,
strict incompatibility and ineligibility. The dependent variable in columns I and II is the average score of the
Kaufmann government eectiveness index for the years 2003, 2005 and 2007. The dependent variable in columns
III and IV is the average of the government nal consumption expenditure for the years 2000 to 2008. The
reference category in the columns I and II is \French legal origin". Signicance levels: * :05 < p < :1, **
:01 < p < :05, *** p < :01.
Sources: See Tables A.2-A.4.
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Appendix
Figure A.1: Marginal eects of a strict incompatibility or ineligibility regime conditional on
the parliamentary base remuneration
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Notes: Marginal eects on the fraction of public servants in parliament based on specication II in Table 3. The
variable parliamentary base remuneration is calculated as a ratio that sets the salary in relation to GDP per
capita. The variable is mean adjusted.
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Figure A.2: Marginal eects of a strict incompatibility or ineligibility regime conditional on
the level of corruption
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Notes: Marginal eects on the fraction of public servants in parliament based on specication IV in Table 3.
The variable corruption is taken from Kaufmann et al. (2008). The index is inverted implying that higher values
correspond to higher corruption. Moreover, the variable is standardized with mean zero and standard deviation
one.
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Figure A.3: Marginal eects of a strict incompatibility or ineligibility regime conditional on
the relative salary between the private and the public sector
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Notes: Marginal eects on the fraction of public servants in parliament based on specication VI in Table 3.
The variable relative salary between the private and the public sector is dened as the salary of an accountant
relative to the salary of a teacher. The ratio is adjusted by subtracting one.
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Table A.1a: Occupational composition of the House of Commons of the United Kingdom
elected in 2005
# Fraction
Public sector
Professors or lecturers 44 0.0715
Teachers 47 0.0764
Scientists 7 0.0114
Civil servants 28 0.0455
Military/ police ocers 14 0.0228
Total 140 0.2276
Professions related to political activities
Professional politicians or professions related to political activities 87 0.1415
Other sectors
Barristers, solicitors, lawyers 72 0.1171
Architects 7 0.0114
Engineers 5 0.0081
Medical professions 6 0.0098
Consultants 2 0.0033
Business, trade, and industry employees, including executives 118 0.1919
Media writers, publishers, broadcasters and producers 43 0.0699
Accountants 10 0.0163
Employees of Private Company 78 0.1268
Farmers 8 0.0130
Manual workers 38 0.0618
Total 387 0.6293
Others
Housewives 1 0.0016
Total 615 1
Notes: The statistic covers 615 seats held by the three main parties (Labour, Conservatives
and Liberal Democrats) out of a total of 646 seats.
Source: Inter-Parliamentary Union (2005).
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Table A.1b: Occupational composition of the Algerian Parliament in 2007
# Fraction
Public sector
Public servants and public administrators 131 0.3368
Educators 56 0.1440
Military and police ocers 3 0.0077
Scientists and researchers 1 0.0026
Total 191 0.4910
Other sectors
Legal professions 30 0.0771
Medical professions (doctors, dentists, nurses) 20 0.0514
Liberal professions (including artists, authors) and sport professionals 37 0.0951
Consultants (including real estate agents) 13 0.0334
Business, trade, and industry employees, including executives 12 0.0308
Bankers (including investment bankers) and accountants 7 0.0180
Media-related professions (journalists and publishers) 2 0.0051
Farmers and agricultural workers (including wine growers) 2 0.0051
Economists 1 0.0026
Total 124 0.3188
Others
Retired 31 0.0797
Unemployed 2 0.0051
Total 33 0.0848
Unknown 41 0.1054
Total 389 1
Notes: The category \public servants" and \public administrators" includes social and
development workers.
Source: Inter-Parliamentary Union (2007).
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Table A.1c: Occupational composition of the 17th German Parliament (Bundestag) elected in
2008
# Fraction
1. Employed
1.1 Public service (public servants and employees in the public service)
Public administration 62 0.0997
Police 7 0.0113
Judiciary 13 0.0209
Military 3 0.0048
Municipal public servants 13 0.0209
Educational professions and researchers 86 0.1383
Medical professions 9 0.0145
Others 6 0.0096
Total 199 0.3199
1.2 Professions related to political activities
Employees of parties 36 0.0579
Employees of trade unions 24 0.0386
Former employees of parliamentarians 14 0.0225
Others 16 0.0257
Total 90 0.1447
1.3 Private sector employees including employees of
professional associations
Employees in artisanry, manufacturing, industry, sales and services 54 0.0868
Agricultural workers 1 0.0016
Employees in nancial sector 6 0.0096
Insurance employees 2 0.0032
Media employees 14 0.0225
Others 20 0.0322
Total 97 0.1559
2. Self-employed
2.1 Liberal professions
Legal professions 102 0.1640
Medical professions 4 0.0064
Media-related professions 21 0.0338
Liberal technical professions 4 0.0064
Other liberal professions 7 0.0113
Total 138 0.2219
{ continued on next page {
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Table A.1c { continued
2.2 Other self-employed
Self-employed in artisanry, manufacturing, industry, sales and services 32 0.0514
Farmers 11 0.0177
Insurance broker 3 0.0048
Others 3 0.0048
Total 49 0.0788
3. Others
Housewives 2 0.0032
Students or in apprenticeship 8 0.0129
Clerical professions 6 0.0096
Total 16 0.0257
4. Unknown 33 0.0531
Total 622 1
Source: German parliamentary online service.
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Table A.2: Data sources and descriptive statistics for the fraction of public servants in national
parliaments
Country Year of election Fraction of public servants in %
Adjusted Unadjusted
Own coding based on national parliamentary statistics
Albania 2001 24.42 22.14
Austria 2008 33.88 33.88
Germany 2009 33.78 31.99
Italy 2008 19.97 19.97
Own coding based on the national parliamentary online data bases containing detailed
and systematic individual information
Canada 2006 19.87 19.87
Finland 2008 46.49 43.00
Ireland 2007 31.55 31.55
Israel 2009 29.87 19.17
Spain 2011 43.75 40.11
Own coding based on the individual MP's webpage (without systematic information)
United States of America 2008 33.10 32.65
Own coding based on Inter-Parliamentary Union statistics for national parliaments
Algeria 2007 54.88 49.10
Andorra 2005 19.23 17.86
Argentina 2007 18.69 16.86
Armenia 2007 17.56 17.56
Australia 2004 18.00 18.00
Azerbaijan 2005 27.44 26.96
Bahrain 2010 37.50 37.50
Belarus 2004 37.97 27.27
Belgium 2007 25.18 24.00
Bosnia and Herzegovina 2002 9.52 9.52
Bulgaria 2005 20.26 18.08
Burkina Faso 2002 45.05 45.05
Burundi 2005 48.31 48.31
Central African Republic 2005 44.66 43.81
Chile 2009 20.83 20.83
Congo, Rep. 2007 34.45 22.63
Costa Rica 2010 13.00 13.00
Cyprus 2006 21.82 21.43
Czech Republic 2010 45.50 45.50
Denmark 2007 53.99 49.16
Djibouti 2008 73.85 73.85
Dominica 2005 28.58 25.81
{ continued on next page {
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Table A.2 { continued
Egypt, Arab Rep. 2007 26.16 24.61
Estonia 2007 41.23 39.60
France 2007 34.34 29.64
Gambia 2002 48.08 47.17
Greece 2007 18.67 18.67
Haiti 2006 31.03 27.55
Hungary 2006 26.63 25.39
Indonesia 2004 9.58 9.27
Kuwait 2006 56.52 40.00
Latvia 2006 45.00 45.00
Lebanon 2009 34.38 34.38
Liechtenstein 2005 20.00 20.00
Luxembourg 2004 43.33 43.33
Macedonia, FYR 2008 26.41 23.33
Mali 2007 42.23 38.78
Republic of Moldova 2005 25.00 23.76
Monaco 2008 15.00 12.50
Mongolia 2008 21.33 21.33
Netherlands 2010 30.33 30.33
New Zealand 2008 41.66 40.98
Niger 2004 29.20 29.20
Nigeria 2007 36.18 25.83
Norway 2005 26.74 24.08
Peru 2001 16.66 15.83
Philippines 2001 16.04 15.89
Poland 2007 38.91 38.91
Portugal 2005 39.11 38.26
Romania 2008 14.97 14.97
Samoa 2006 20.41 20.41
Senegal 2001 31.67 31.67
Serbia 2007 24.89 22.00
Singapore 2001 6.49 5.95
Slovak Republic 2006 29.58 28.00
Solomon Islands 2006 58.00 58.00
Sri Lanka 2010 12.89 12.89
Suriname 2005 60.41 56.86
Switzerland 2007 22.16 20.50
Syrian Arab Republic 2007 35.54 34.40
Tajikistan 2005 33.33 33.33
Thailand 2007 12.76 11.88
Tunisia 2009 52.34 52.34
Turkey 2007 30.42 27.27
Uganda 2006 36.97 31.63
{ continued on next page {
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Table A.2 { continued
United Kingdom 2005 22.76 22.76
Notes: For Belarus, we report the professional composition for the 80 newly elected parliamen-
tarians (out of 110 parliamentarians).
In Dominica, 9 out of 31 members of parliament are directly appointed by the head of state.
For th UK, the occupational composition is reported only for 615 out of 645 members of parlia-
ment, i.e. for the three major parties (Labour, Conservatives and Liberal Democrats).
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Table A.3 Incompatibility regimes in nations in 2010
Country Regime Source
Albania Compatibility Inter-Parliamentary Union
Algeria Soft incompatibility Inter-Parliamentary Union
Andorra Strict incompatibility Inter-Parliamentary Union
Argentina Soft incompatibility Inter-Parliamentary Union
Armenia Soft incompatibility Inter-Parliamentary Union
Australia Strict incompatibility Inter-Parliamentary Union
Austria Soft incompatibility Austrian Constitution Article
59
Azerbaijan Soft incompatibility Inter-Parliamentary Union
Bahrain Soft incompatibility Inter-Parliamentary Union
Belarus Soft incompatibility Inter-Parliamentary Union
Belgium Strict incompatibility Inter-Parliamentary Union
Bosnia and Herzegovina Soft incompatibility Inter-Parliamentary Union
Bulgaria Strict incompatibility Inter-Parliamentary Union
Burkina Faso Strict incompatibility Inter-Parliamentary Union
Burundi Strict incompatibility Inter-Parliamentary Union
Canada Soft incompatibility Inter-Parliamentary Union
Central African Republic Soft incompatibility Inter-Parliamentary Union
Chile Soft incompatibility Inter-Parliamentary Union
Congo, Rep. Soft incompatibility Inter-Parliamentary Union
Costa Rica Soft incompatibility Inter-Parliamentary Union
Cyprus Strict incompatibility Inter-Parliamentary Union
Czech Republic Compatibility Inter-Parliamentary Union
Denmark Compatibility Inter-Parliamentary Union
Djibouti Soft incompatibility Inter-Parliamentary Union
Dominica Compatibility Inter-Parliamentary Union
Egypt, Arab Republic Strict incompatibility Inter-Parliamentary Union
Estonia Strict incompatibility Inter-Parliamentary Union
Finland Compatibility Inter-Parliamentary Union
France Strict incompatibility Inter-Parliamentary Union
Gambia Soft incompatibility Inter-Parliamentary Union
Germany Strict incompatibility German Constitution Article
137 and the Law for the mem-
bers of the German parlia-
ment
Greece Ineligibility Hellenic Constitution Articles
55-57
Haiti Ineligibility Inter-Parliamentary Union
Hungary Soft incompatibility Inter-Parliamentary Union
Indonesia Strict incompatibility Inter-Parliamentary Union
{ continued on next page {
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Table A.3 { continued
Ireland Strict incompatibility Inter-Parliamentary Union
Israel Soft incompatibility Inter-Parliamentary Union
Italy Strict incompatibility Inter-Parliamentary Union
Kuwait Soft incompatibility Inter-Parliamentary Union
Latvia Soft incompatibility Inter-Parliamentary Union
Lebanon Ineligibility Inter-Parliamentary Union
Liechtenstein Soft incompatibility Inter-Parliamentary Union
Luxembourg Strict incompatibility Inter-Parliamentary Union
Macedonia, FYR Soft incompatibility Inter-Parliamentary Union
Mali Soft incompatibility Inter-Parliamentary Union
Moldova Strict incompatibility Inter-Parliamentary Union
Monaco Soft incompatibility Inter-Parliamentary Union
Mongolia Strict incompatibility Inter-Parliamentary Union
Netherlands Compatibility Inter-Parliamentary Union
New Zealand Soft incompatibility Inter-Parliamentary Union
Niger Strict incompatibility Inter-Parliamentary Union
Nigeria Strict incompatibility Inter-Parliamentary Union
Norway Soft incompatibility Inter-Parliamentary Union
Peru Strict incompatibility Inter-Parliamentary Union
Philippines Strict incompatibility Inter-Parliamentary Union
Poland Strict incompatibility Inter-Parliamentary Union
Portugal Strict incompatibility Inter-Parliamentary Union
Romania Strict incompatibility Inter-Parliamentary Union
Samoa Strict incompatibility Inter-Parliamentary Union
Senegal Strict incompatibility Inter-Parliamentary Union
Serbia Strict incompatibility Inter-Parliamentary Union
Singapore Strict incompatibility Inter-Parliamentary Union
Slovak Republic Soft incompatibility Inter-Parliamentary Union
Solomon Islands Strict incompatibility Inter-Parliamentary Union
Spain Soft incompatibility Inter-Parliamentary Union
Sri Lanka Strict incompatibility Inter-Parliamentary Union
Suriname Compatibility Inter-Parliamentary Union
Switzerland Soft incompatibility Law for the National Parlia-
ment Article 14
Syrian Arab Republic Strict incompatibility Inter-Parliamentary Union
Tajikistan Strict incompatibility Inter-Parliamentary Union
Thailand Strict incompatibility Inter-Parliamentary Union
Tunisia Strict incompatibility Inter-Parliamentary Union
Turkey Strict incompatibility Inter-Parliamentary Union
Uganda Ineligibility Uganda Constitution Articles
77-82
United Kingdom Ineligibility House of Commons Disquali-
cation Act
{ continued on next page {
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Table A.3 { continued
United States Ineligibility US Constitution, Article 1,
Section 6, Clause 2 and Hatch
Act and its amendments
Notes: Some countries apply specic incompatibility rules that complement the general rules
considered in the coding and which go beyond the public sector.
Persons holding posts for foreign states or for international organizations are incompatible with
a parliamentary mandate. This is the case in Burundi, Egypt, Moldova, Niger and Serbia.
Government contractors are incompatible with a parliamentary mandate in Chile, Costa Rica,
Haiti, Italy, Philippines, Sri Lanka and Thailand.
Australia: Persons with any nancial interest in an agreement with the government are declared
incompatible unless the responsible parliamentary commission declares the position to be
compatible.
Austria: Executives of joint stock companies, banking, commercial, transport and industrial
private limited companies, provincial credit institutes and mutual insurance companies are
incompatible with a parliamentary mandate unless the responsible parliamentary commission
declares the position to be compatible.
Belgium: Lawyers continuously receiving mandates from public authorities are incompatible
with a parliamentary mandate.
Dominica: Certain government contractors are incompatible with a parliamentary mandate.
Finland: Single positions in the public service are covered by rules of incompatibility. Members
of the army face ineligibility.
France: Further incompatible oces are 1) posts attributed and remunerated by a foreign state
or an international organization and with some exceptions 2) managers or directors of rms i)
benetting from state or local government administration subsidies ii) working principally for
or under the control of the state iii) entitled to public savings and iv) involved in real estate.
Greece: The ineligibility rule does not apply to university professors. They face incompatbility.
Furthermore, incompatible with a parliamentary mandate are members of a board of directors,
general managers, their alternates, or employees of commercial companies or enterprises
enjoying special privileges or subsidies by the state.
Haiti: Educational professions appear not to be covered by ineligibility provision.
Lebanon: For educational professions, compatibility is assumed, as, for instance, teaching sta
is explicitly exempted from ineligibility rules.
Netherlands: Judges of the Supreme Court, members of the General Board of Auditors and
clerks or any other ocial of either Chamber are incompatible with a parliamentary mandate.
Employees of the national parliament as well as public servants of the national public audit
institution face an incompatibility rule.
Portugal: Persons holding posts for foreign states or international organizations as well as
members of the board of directors of companies in which the state is the majority shareholder
are incompatible with a parliamentary mandate.
Senegal: Some positions in the public service, such as governors and their deputies, judges and
other senior ocials of national services and public institutions are covered by an ineligibility
rule. Persons holding posts for international organizations as well as government contractors
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are incompatible with a parliamentary mandate.
Switzerland: Public servants at the federal level face incompatibility rules.
Syrian Arab Republic: Government commissioners and police ocers can be elected in another
constituency than the one where they are working (after obtaining an authorization).
Tunisia: Judges, heads of diplomatic missions and diplomatic and consular posts, governors,
governorate rst delegates, secretaries general, sector delegates and heads are ineligibile.
Persons holding posts for international organizations are incompatible with a parliamentary
mandate.
Uganda: Traditional and cultural leaders also face ineligibility.
Unites Kingdom: Educational professions are excluded from the general ineligibility rule applied.
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Table A.4: Description of variables
Variable Description
Control variables
Democracy rating The Freedom House democracy rating summarizes the
current state of political rights and civil liberties. On a
scale from 1 to 7, a rating of 1 indicates the highest de-
gree of freedom and 7 the lowest level of freedom. More-
over, each pair of political rights and civil liberties rat-
ings in 2000 is averaged to determine an overall status of
\free", \partly free" or \not free". Countries with aver-
ages between 1.0 and 2.5 are considered free, between 3.0
and 5.0 partly free, and between 5.5 and 7.0 not free.
We inverted the rating for the year 2000 in order to
allow an intuitive interpretation of the results. Source:
www.freedomhouse.org.
Disclosure rule index The variable for disclosure is based on the index of sources
publicly available out of the disclosure rule indexes con-
structed by Djankov et al. (2010). The index measures
the ratio of all the source items contained in the coun-
try's disclosure form available to the public over all the
source items potentially disclosed in the articial univer-
sal form. It measures how many conceivable disclosures
of source items are publicly available in practice. The
range of the variable is between 0 (no disclosure) and 1
(full disclosure). Source: Djankov et al. (2010).
Ethnic fractionalization The index of ethnolinguistic fractionalization approxi-
mates the absence of ethnic and linguistic cohesion within
a country, ranging from 0 (homogeneous) to 1 (strongly
fractionalized) and averaging 5 dierent indexes. Source:
Alesina et al. (2003).
{ continued on next page {
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Table A.4 { continued
Freedom of the press The freedom of the press index assesses the degree of
print, broadcast, and internet freedom in every country in
the world, analyzing the events and developments of each
calendar year. Ratings are determined through an exam-
ination of three broad categories: the legal environment
in which media operate, political inuences on report-
ing and access to information, and economic pressures
on content and the dissemination of news. The inverted
score ranges from 0 (worst) to 100 (best). Countries with
values between 70 and 100 are considered to have \free"
media, between 40 and 69 \partly free" media, and be-
tween 0 and 39 \not free" media. The average score of
the freedom of the press index for the years 2003, 2005,
2007 and 2009 is taken. Source: Freedom House.
Kaufmann corruption index Average score of the Kaufmann corruption index for the
years 2003, 2005 and 2007. Perceived control of corrup-
tion captures the extent to which public power is exer-
cised for private gain, including both petty and grand
forms of corruption, as well as "capture" of the state by
elites and private interests. The index is one of the com-
posite measures of governance generated by the UCM. It
is in units of a standard normal distribution with mean
zero, a standard deviation of one, and running from ap-
proximately -2.5 to 2.5. We apply an inverted scale with
higher values corresponding to worse governance; i.e.,
higher corruption. Source: Kaufmann et al. (2008).
Legal origin Legal origin of the company law or commercial law of each
country. Each dummy variable is equal to 1 if the origin
of the law of the country is French, German, English, or
Scandinavian, respectively, and zero otherwise. Source:
La Porta et al. (2008).
Ln(GDP per capita) Natural logarithm of GDP per capita in 2005 converted to
international dollars using purchasing power parity rates.
Source: World Development Indicators (World Bank).
Majority voting system The dummy variable for majority voting systems equals
1 if all the members of the lower house are elected under
plurality rule, 0 otherwise. Source: Norris (2009).
{ continued on next page {
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Table A.4 { continued
Mean district magnitude The variable district magnitude captures the relationship
between the number of seats in parliament and the num-
ber of electoral districts. It ranges from 1 in countries
with all single-member districts to 150, where there are
150 parliamentary seats and a single country-wide elec-
toral district. The information on the district magnitude
is taken from the database on political institutions (DPI)
for the year 2005. Source: World Bank.
Parliamentary remuneration The national parliamentary base remuneration is ex-
pressed relative to the national GDP per capita. The
data for the European countries refer to the year 2004.
For the remaining countries, the information is taken for
years within the period 2009-2012. Sources: Corbett et
al. (2005), ocial homepage of the European Parlia-
ment, the Australian Government, the Congress of Peru,
the Norwegian Parliament, the Oce of the Clerk of the
U.S. House of Representatives, www.novinite.com, and
www.about.com.
Population over 65 years (%) People aged 65 years and older as a percentage of the
total population in 2005. Source: World Development
Indicators (World Bank).
Population under 15 years (%) People aged 15 years and younger as a percentage of the
total population in 2005. Source: World Development
Indicators (World Bank).
Presidential system For the form of government, we follow the denition
used by Persson and Tabellini (2005). The countries are
classied as presidential if the chief executive is not ac-
countable to the legislature through a vote of condence.
Source: Persson and Tabellini (2005) and the dataset
on democratic electoral institutions provided by Borman
and Goulder (2013).
{ continued on next page {
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Table A.4 { continued
Relative salary between the pri-
vate and public sector
The variable is dened as the ratio of the salary between
occupations in the private and the public sector. For
the private sector, the occupation accountant (ILO, oc-
cupation code 129) is taken. For the public sector, the
occupation teacher in language and literature (ILO oc-
cupation code 149) is chosen. The ratios are based on
salaries for the year 2005. Due to limited data availabil-
ity, for some countries, information is taken for the years
which are closest to 2005. For an easier interpretation
of the empirical analysis, the ratios are adjusted by sub-
tracting one. Source: International Labor Organization
(Labour Statistics Database).
Trade (% of GDP) Sum of exports and imports of goods and services mea-
sured as a share of gross domestic product in 2005.
Source: World Development Indicators (World Bank).
Outcome variables
Government eectiveness The government eectiveness indicator is measuring per-
ceptions of the quality of public services, the quality
of the civil service and the degree of its independence
from political pressures, the quality of policy formulation
and implementation, and the credibility of the govern-
ment's commitment to such policies. The index is one
of the composite measures of governance generated by
the UCM. It is in units of a standard normal distribution
with mean zero, a standard deviation of one, and run-
ning from approximately -2.5 to 2.5, with higher values
corresponding to better governance. The average score of
the government eectiveness indicator for the years 2003,
2005 and 2007 is used. Source: Kaufmann et al. (2008).
Government nal consumption
expenditure (% of GDP)
Average value for the years 2000-2008. General gov-
ernment nal consumption expenditure (formerly gen-
eral government consumption) includes all government
current expenditures for purchases of goods and services
(including compensation of employees). It also includes
most expenditures on national defense and security, but
excludes government military expenditures that are part
of government capital formation. Source: World Devel-
opment Indicators (World Bank).
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